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The Chamber's mission is to advance human progress through an economic, 
political and social system based on individual freedom, 
incentive, initiative, opportunity and responsibility. 
' 
The Cl:lamber of Commerce of the United States is the largest 
federation of business and professional organizations in the 
world, and is the principal spokesman for the .American business 
community. The U.S. Chamber represents more than 226,000 
members, of which more than 221,000 are business firms, more 
than 2,600 are state and local chambers of commerce, and more 
than 1,200 are trade and professional associations. 
More than 90 percent of the Chamber's members are small 
business firms having fewer than 100 employees. Yet, virtually 
all of the nation's largest industrial and business concerns 
are also active members. We are particularly cognizant of the 
problems of smaller businesses, as well as issues facing the 
business community at large. 
Besides representing a cross section of the American business 
community in terms of number of employees, the U.S. Chamber 
represents a wide management spectrum by type of business and 
location. Each major classification of .American business --
manufacturing, retailing, services, construction, wholesaling, 
and finance -- numbers more than 15,000 members in the u.s. 
Chamber. Yet no one group constitutes as much as 23 percent of 
the total Cl:lamber membership. Further, the Chamber has 
substantial membership in all 50 states. 
The Chamber's international reach is. substantial as well. It 
believes that global interdependence provides an opportunity 
and not a threat. In addition to the 47 .American Chambers of 
Commerce Abroad, an increasing number of Chamber members are 
engaged in the export and import of both goods and services, 
and have ongoing investment activities. The Chamber favors 
strengthened international competitiveness and opposes 
artificial U.S. and foreign barriers to international business. 
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Mr. Chairman, I am Arthur T. Downey, partner in the Washington office 
of the law firm of Sutherland, Asbill and Brennan. Prior to this position, I 
was responsible for the administration of the United States' export control 
process as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Corrunerce for East-West Trade. In 
addition to my private legal practice, I am also chairman of the U.S. Chamber 
of Corrunerce's Task Force on Trade with the Nonmarket Economies, the unit 
responsible for formulating the Chamber's positions on East-West trade policy. 
I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that you have called hearings on the foreign 
policy controls section of the Export Administration Act (EAA) and that you have 
given me the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Chamber on this most im-
portant subject. As you are aware, the Chamber is the world's largest business 
association with a membership of over 230,000 small, medium and large busi-
nesses, trade and professional associations, and state and local chambers. 
In the course of the last several years, the U.S. Chamber of Corrunerce 
has repeatedly expressed its concern over this country's propensity to control 
unilaterally, for foreign policy purposes, the export of goods and technology. 
Since enactment of the EAA, such controls have cost the United States billions 
of dollars in export sales and tens of thousands of real and potential jobs. 
Most damagingly, the United States has suffered significant harm to its 
reputation for corrunercial reliability, while concomitantly encouraging the 
creation of long-term foreign competition. 
Paradoxically, this has occurred at the same time our government 
has attempted to educate U.S. business as to the importance of exports for the 
economic well-being of our country. The result has been continued uncertainty 
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within both the agricultural and industrial communities and a frustration 
over what many see as undue regulation of the marketplace. While we 
hesitate, our trading competitors aggressively promote their exports around 
the world, including the United States. 
Earlier this month, in a much welcomed speech, President Reagan 
referred to a "$2 trillion market abroad" and "a chance to create millions 
of jobs and more income security for our people" through an expanded national 
export program. As the President noted, four out of five new manufacturing 
jobs created in the last five years were in export-related industries. The 
President also correctly noted that 90 percent of American manufacturers, 
especially small and medium-sized firms, do not export at all. 
In his speech, President Reagan outlined a plan to meet the trade 
challenges before us. Included in this plan are government efforts "to en-
hance the ability of U.S. producers and industries to compete on a fair and 
equal basis in the international marketplace." In this regard, the President 
noted the disincentive to export expansion created by U.S. controls on the 
export of technology, and referred positively to this Administration's success 
in eliminating a backlog of 2,000 export license applications and in relaxing 
export controls on low-technology items. 
We applaud these efforts and, in particular, the personal commitment 
the President has made to export expansion through freer trade. We welcome 
the President's offer to work with American business and it is in 
this spirit that we offer our comments this morning. There is likely no other 
area of such importance in which to begin this joint effort than the adminis-
tration of our country's exports. 
The Realities of the Present International Economic System 
During this year's reauthorization process, it is important that we 
dispel certain myths regarding our position in the world economic system 
which have impaired the effective implementation of the EAA. These points 
were discussed by Kempton Jenkins, Vice President of Armco Inc., during recent 
hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee and are worthy of repetition. 
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First is the view of the United States as the predominant supplier 
of equipment and technology. This view is a residue of the days when the 
United States was the preeminent economic power of the world. Although 
this no longer is the case, policymakers in this country have exhibited an 
increasing tendency to use export controls as a means to further political 
ideals without a careful assessment of foreign availability and, conse-
quently, the costs or effectiveness of these decisions. 
Second is the misconception that the Soviets and other potential 
adversaries are uniquely dependent upon Western technology. In fact, they 
are part of a real world in which we are, to differing degrees, all inter-
dependent. Our Western competitors' and the Soviets' ability to channel 
resources into the development of specific technology is clear. Thus, 
the threat of export sanctions has led inevitably to investment in, and 
development of, the technology or product in question. 
Third, corporations are not merely institutions. They encompass 
the workers, shareholders and communities in which they are located. This 
point was brought home to Congress during testimony last summer by the UAW 
representative from Springfield, Illinois, who aptly described the strains 
and dislocations caused to cities, such as Springfield, by non-security 
trade embargoes. 
Finally, Mr. Chairman, we should deal with the myth that unilateral 
action by the United States is an act of strength and leadership. Any uni-
lateral U.S. action that weakens alliance unity diminishes a most important 
strategic Western advantage and sends a signal to Moscow of weakness, not 
strength. 
The Long-Term Cost to the United States of Unilateral Export Controls 
Any discussion of the realities of the-world marketplace must 
begin with the experiences of the U.S. agricultural community as a 
result of the administration of export controls. The United States has 
lost important shares of the world's agricultural markets in recent years, 
as a result of the imposition of unilateral agricultural export controls. 
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Through such controls, the United States has provided the incentives for 
the creation of a permanent foreign competition. This was as evident ten 
years ago when an embargo on U.S. soybean exports led Brazil to increase 
substantially its soya production and subsequently to become a major force 
in world markets, as it is today following the 1980 agricultural embargo 
against the USSR. As President Reagan pointed out on January 11 before 
the American Farm Bureau Federation, following the 1980 grain embargo, our 
74 percent share of the Soviet market plummeted to 30 percent. This is 
particularly devastating in a period when we have massive surpluses in 
storage facilities around the country. 
Leaders in the agricultural sector agree that the cumulative cost 
of the grain embargo to the United States has already exceeded $40 billion, 
and continues to grow. Coming at a time of perilous balance in the fragile 
agricultural market place, the unprecedented and ill-considered grain embargo 
of 1980 sparked a financial chain reaction. It affected planting, rail 
transportation, grain storage facilities, agricultural equipment purchases 
(International Harvester points to it as a major catalyst in its decline), 
farmbelt banking and insurance, grain mills, and on and on. 
The recent Caterpillar experience with unilateral, non-security 
export controls on pipelayers is another graphic illustration. One need 
only examine what happened to Caterpillar's sales and those of Komatsu, 
its major international competitor, to the Soviet Union since mid-1978 
when foreign policy export controls were placed on oil and natural gas 
equipment. Prior to mid-1978, Caterpillar dominated the Soviet market 
for large machines, supplying 85 percent of the market. Since the 
imposition of sanctions, the reversal has been dramatic. Komatsu now 
holds an 85 percent share of a rapidly growing market. Had Caterpillar 
maintained the share of business it held before the sanctions, as 
much as $400 million of additional U.S. exports and 12,000 man-years of 
employment at Caterpillar and its suppliers could have been generated. 
Follow-up sales of replacement parts would probably have added another 
25 percent or $100 million in exports and 3,000 jobs. In view of the 
fact that these foreign policy export controls did not seriously dis-
advantage the Soviets, this seems an expensive price for Peoria and 
other communities to pay. 
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The U.S. aerospace industry has also incurred substantial costs 
as a result of the imposition of foreign policy export controls. One 
U.S. manufacturer alone estimates that it has lost $1 billion in the 
Middle East because the company is viewed as an unreliable supplier due 
to the proliferation of U.S. foreign policy export controls since en-
actment of the 1979 Act. An increasing number of customers are now 
requiring U.S. aircraft manufacturers to guarantee export licenses. Due 
to delays in licensing or through the cancellation of export licenses, 
U.S. manufacturers have had to repay to their customers progress payments, 
together with substantial interest penalties. In the case of contract 
cancellations, the manufacturer must also sustain the cost of modification 
of the aircraft for resale. This may run over $1 million per 
airplane. The affected U.S. firms must also pay substantial storage costs, 
for in many instances up to two years, as well as the costs of keeping the 
aircraft in operating condition. We must recognize that the transfer of 
business from U.S. aircraft producers to our European competition does not 
advance U.S. foreign policy; it erodes U.S. aerospace capacity. 
The experiences of Armco Incorporated point to similar conclusions. 
After almost four years of technical and commercial negotiations, Armco and 
Nippon Steel Corporation signed in December 1979 a contract with the Soviets 
valued at $353 million. The contract provided that Armco and Nippon would 
supply technology, engineering services and equipment to build a plant in 
Novolipetsk for the manufacture of electrical steel. The U.S. portion of 
the contract was valued at $100 million. At the time of the contract 
signing, Armco had received 94 percent of all necessary licenses from the 
U.S. government. In January 1980, following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, President Carter suspended all export licenses for the Soviet 
Union. In April, the Armco contract was terminated by the Soviets because 
Armco's export licenses had not yet been reinstated. In August, Creusot-
Loire of France signed a substantially similar contract with the Soviets 
despite "assurances" from the French government that they would not take 
over contracts from American firms. As a result, Armco lost $6.5 million 
in negotiating expenses, $16.7 million in profits, and $20-30 million in 
future spare parts orders, as well as the chance to participate in 
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the next phase of the plant development. Most importantly, the United 
States lost $100 million in exports and some 4,000 jobs. 
The realities of the world trade system also become strikingly clear 
when we examine the effects export sanctions have had on the American oil and 
gas equipment industry. Today we are witnessing widespread foreign production 
of advanced oil and gas equipment where a few years ago the United States 
was the sole supplier of advanced systems. In this regard, we should not 
delude ourselves over Soviet abilities to get these goods elsewhere in the 
world or their own capabilities to produce similar equipment. The Soviets 
are now perfecting their own technologies to produce oil and gas equipment, 
including compressors for use on natural gas pipelines. As a result, 
we are rapidly losing markets traditionally dominated by U.S. oil 
and gas equipment firms. Lost markets have translated into 
declining earnings and major constraints on research and development, 
all of which raises major concerns as to the international competitiveness 
of this U.S. industry in the years to come. 
Foreign Policy Export Controls 
The issue facing Congress as it reviews Section 6 of the 
EAA is how to fashion the most effective set of economic tools to 
assist the President in the implementation of this country's foreign 
policy. Furthermore, it is crucial that Congress devise a mechanism 
to assess more accurately the likely costs and effectiveness of the 
use of these economic tools. 
The Chamber recognizes that the President must be able on his own 
without further Congressional action -- to restrict exports in order to 
fulfil! obligations of the United States pursuant to international agree-
ments. By their nature, controls imposed under this authority are 
multilateral in character. 
In addition to this export control authority, the 1979 Act pro-
vides the President with authority to restrict the export of crime control 
and detection instruments to certain countries. The Chamber supports 
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these controls, which together with those provided for under separate 
legislative authority, constitute a body of law well understood by both 
American exporters and their foreign purchasers. 
However, the Export Administration Act of 1979 also provides broad 
authority to control exports in order to further significantly the foreign 
policy of the United States. In recent years, this authority has been 
arbitrarily invoked with inadequate justification, without significant 
consultation and without adequate consideration of the effectiveness of 
export sanctions or the long-term cost to U.S. economic well-being. 
To remedy this situation, in the absence of an international emergency, 
Congress should require that, prior to the imposition of foreign policy 
controls, meaningful consultations with the private sector and Congress must 
be undertaken to determine the full extent of the costs of these controls to 
the United States. The Act should prohibit the extension of export controls 
for foreign policy purposes on a retroactive basis to foreign companies, 
including U.S. foreign subsidiaries and the licensees of U.S. corporations. 
It should prohibit the imposition of foreign policy export controls so as to 
impair existing contracts, and, above all, it should provide specific re-
strictions against the imposition of unilateral export controls, given the 
futility and costs of such actions. 
One way to achieve these principles would be to require that the 
President seek specific legislative authority, along the lines of the crime 
equipment controls, prior to the imposition of any new foreign policy controls. 
Special legislation -- such as occurred with the Uganda sanctions in 1978 --
could give the President clear authority to draw upon the full range of economic 
interactions, including imports and financial transactions, as well as exports. 
This would relieve the vital and vulnerable export sector from carrying the 
brunt of economic sanctions. This would also provide business, unions and other 
affected groups the full opportunity to express their views during the 
legislative process. It would also produce a solidly based foreign policy 
initiative, representing a full national statement, not simply a hasty 
act by the Executive Branch. 
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Another approach to this same goal would be to provide, in the 
absence of an international emergency, a forum to give the public an oppor-
tunity to consult with the Administration and Congress prior to the imposition 
of a foreign policy export control. Rather than requiring specific legislative 
authority, the Act could require that the Executive Branch receive public comment 
and submit to Congress a comprehensive cost/benefit analysis justifying the 
proposed controls prior to their taking effect. Such controls could expire 
after a six month period unless renewed following the same rigorous requirements 
for their imposition. 
Whatever procedure is ultimately adopted, Congress must not lose sight 
of the general principles of contract sanctity, the avoidance of extraterritorial 
applications, and the requirement for multilateral controls, advanced consul-
tations, a rigorous cost/benefit analysis, and assurance that export trade re-
strictions are imposed only when necessary to achieve a genuinely significant 
and fundamental foreign policy goal. These principles must be recognized in 
legislation so that an export control law that defends our international 
political interests will not undermine our competitiveness in international trade 
and erode our reputation for commercial reliability at a serious cost to U.S. 
economic well-being. 
S.397, Export Administration Act Amendments of 1983 
Commenting briefly on legislation currently before this body, we 
commend you, Mr. Chairman, as well as Senator Garn, for the serious attention 
you have given the export administration process, as exemplified by S.397 and 
S.434. As S.434 represents a simple extension of the present foreign policy 
controls authority, I would like to focus my comments on S.397. 
As the events of the last five years have clearly indicated, unilateral 
foreign policy controls in situations where alternate suppliers exist impact 
almost exclusively on U.S. exporters. Again, there may be times when, regard-
less of foreign availability, as in the case of crime control and detection 
instruments, the United States may wish to place controls on the exports of 
specific items. It is important, however, that there be a consensus behind 
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the imposition of such controls rather than have them serve as a source 
of division between the Executive Branch on the one hand and Congress 
and business community on the other. 
A positive feature of S.397 is the way in which it deals with 
the criteria that currently must be considered before the imposition of 
foreign policy export controls. By strengthening the criteria, including 
the addition of language on the extraterritorial effects of proposed 
controls, and modifying them from a "consider" format to a "determine" 
one, the bill represents a significant effort to achieve a more thorough 
analysis of the costs of foreign policy controls prior to the imposition 
of such controls. 
With regard to the requirement that other countries support the 
imposition or expansion of those controls invoked under the foreign policy 
controls section, we suggest that it be strengthened to require that those 
controls be imposed on a multilateral basis by the major suppliers of the 
goods or technologies in question. Such a revision would preclude situ-
ations experienced in the past where our trading competitors voiced 
support for our efforts and then proceeded to fill those orders lost by 
U.S. suppliers. 
The most interesting of the criteria established in S.397 is the 
requirement that the President determine that proposed controls will not 
have an adverse effect on the United States' export performance, inter-
national competitiveness, and reputation for commercial reliability or 
an adverse effect on individual U.S. companies, their employees and the 
communities in which they reside. It is time that we recognized that any 
export sanction is going to have a domestic economic cost. Consequently, 
while we agree that the President must carefully weigh these costs, it is 
difficult to accept this provision as either realistic or workable. 
One criterion which S.397 deletes from the present Act is con-
sideration of "the foreign policy consequences of not imposing controls." 
We suggest that a variant of this criterion be retained to require a 
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determination that significant negative consequences would occur if no 
export action were taken. After considering other forms of political 
and economic actions, the President should determine that export controls 
are required in order to achieve the intended foreign policy purpose and 
that no other form of political or economic action would have a similar 
result. 
By requiring that the President transmit a report to Congress on 
his determinations no later than the date on which controls are imposed, 
S.397 represents a serious effort to achieve a more meaningful consultative 
mechanism between the Executive Branch and Congress. This mechanism should 
be even further refined and strengthened to ensure that the consultation 
process is in motion well in advance of decisions to impose foreign policy 
export controls. It is also important that the business community become 
an integral part of this process. If previous consultations with industry 
advisory groups are indicative of the future, strict guidelines need to be 
included in the Act, as well as the legislative history of the Act. 
S.397 also provides that foreign policy export controls "shall 
not apply to exports pursuant to a contract or other agreement entered 
into prior to the imposition of such controls." We applaud this language. 
It is a step in the right direction toward giving U.S. industry similar 
protections to those achieved for the farm community through the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission legislation. 
However, we caution that, unlike agricultural commodity contracts, 
contracts for the sale of industrial equipment and technology are frequently 
long-term and may require years of implementation. Technology transfer, in 
particular, is generally an ongoing process and may require several export 
licenses and license renewals. Any interruption of this process would have 
major consequences for the entire contract. It is, therefore, important 
that any contract sanctity provision recognize this long-term nature of 
industrial cooperation. Without long-term protection in the EAA, our 
Western trading partners will continue to look upon the United States as 
an unreliable supplier of technology. 
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Another area that deserves consideration is the question of judicial re-
view. We do not suggest that the Courts review questions of foreign policy. However, 
we do feel that the Courts have a proper role in reviewing whether 
administrative determinations were supported by evidence or at least 
were not arbitrary and capricious. In the enforcement area, we witnessed 
last summer, following the extraterritorial application of oil and gas 
equipment controls, the costs and unintended difficulties created by 
the lack of judicial review in the export administration process. 
Judicial review need not retard the export control process. 
Rather, it can strengthen the integrity of the export control process by 
making provision for firms seeking relief from arbitrary and capricious 
administrative decisions. In this regard, we propose that the Act pro-
vide exporters a right to appeal to independent or judicial authorities 
Department of Commerce administrative decisions, including statutory 
procedural requirements and administrative penalties. 
Finally, we question the provision in S.397 requiring the President 
to prohibit all imports from a country that is the subject of U.S. foreign 
policy export controls, while at the same time giving the President 
authority to make sweeping exemptions. Export controls should not 
necessarily trigger import restrictions, particularly as the target of 
a foreign policy export control may be purposely limited, such as in the 
case of crime equipment. To mandate import controls or export controls 
would needlessly impair the President's flexibility to use the most 
appropriate mix of economic tools before him. 
Conclusion 
We applaud the Administration's "new priority for trade" as out-
lined in the President's State of the Union address. It is time that we 
all worked together to restore U.S. leadership in world trade. To this 
end, it is crucial that we strengthen the reputation of the United States 
as a reliable supplier and competitive trader operating under a clearly 
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defined and internationally recognized system of export incentives and 
export controls. 
This will require, above all, that the United States reassert its 
position of leadership within the Western Alliance, working with our 
allies to refine and improve Western trade practices and controls. For 
the United States, meeting this challenge will require a joint effort 
by the public and private sectors. 
In conclusion, we wish to underline the fact that the business 
community and specifically the Chamber is dedicated to protecting the 
security interests of the United States. A sound domestic economy is 
an essential part of these security interests. We want to work in the 
spirit of partnership with the Administration and Congress to strengthen 
this country's security and economic well-being. We thank you, 
Mr. Chairman, and the members of this subcommittee for this opportunity. 
